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Abstract
Using the Mirrlees optimal income tax model with a maxi-min social welfare func-
tion, we derive conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill
distribution, a strictly concave tax function in income and a single-peaked average tax
schedule. With additive preferences and a constant labor supply elasticity, marginal
tax rates are decreasing below the modal skill level, and will also decrease above the
mode if aggregate skills are non-decreasing with the skill level. In this case and with a
bounded skill distribution or with a constant hazard rate, the tax function is strictly
concave in income and the average tax rate single-peaked. When quasilinear utility
functions apply in either consumption or leisure, under fairly mild restrictions on the
truncated or untruncated distribution function, marginal tax rates are decreasing in
skill and the average tax proﬁle is single-peaked. The distribution of skills has the
same qualitative inﬂuence for either case of quasilinearity. These results continue to
hold when there is bunching at the bottom due to a binding non-negativity constraint.
We also illustrate how relaxing the assumption of constant elasticity of labor supply,
generally used in the literature, modiﬁes the results.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: H21
1 Introduction
The theory of the optimal income tax structure is a technically complex one that yields
few clear-cut analytical results. The most commonly cited ones involve properties of the
marginal tax rate at the top or bottom of the skill distribution, which are of limited
interest. Even using the relatively simple model devised by Mirrlees (1971), one has to
rely on simulations to obtain typical tax schedules (Tuomala, 1990; Saez, 2001). That is
because the optimal tax structure is the result of several sorts of inﬂuences interacting with
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1one another. One is the responsiveness of labor supply to redistributive taxes. Another is
the social welfare function that determines the equity eﬀects of redistribution. A third is
the shape of the skill distribution (Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001). And, the manner in which
these inﬂuences interact is aﬀected by the incentive constraints that limit the feasibility
of redistribution. This prevents one from analytically deriving the entire optimal tax
schedule.
In this paper, we exploit the fact that one of these inﬂuences can be virtually suppressed
if we take an extreme form of the social welfare function, the maxi-min social welfare
function emphasized by Rawls (1971).1 In the context of optimal income tax theory, the
maxi-min social welfare function becomes simply the utility of the least-skilled individual,
since the incentive constraints ensure that utility is non-decreasing in skills. This eﬀectively
shuts down one of the three inﬂuences mentioned above, and we are left with two main
sources of inﬂuence on the optimal tax structure: the variability of labor and the shape of
the skill distribution. This turns out to simplify the optimal tax problem considerably, and
in many cases to yield explicit solutions and characterizations of the optimal tax structure.
The structure of the optimal income tax function can take interesting forms that contrast
both with those observed in the real world, and those obtained for social welfare functions
with any non-negative degree of aversion to inequality, especially Diamond (1998).
The analysis of the optimal income tax under a maxi-min objective function is not
new (Atkinson, 1975; Phelps, 1973; Kanbur and Tuomala, 1994; Piketty, 1997; d’Autume,
2001; Salanié, 2003). Our approach canbe seen as synthesizing the maxi-min approach and
extending it in some interesting directions. When preferences are additive in consumption
and leisure, marginal tax rates are decreasing over the entire distribution of skills under
reasonable assumptions, unlike in the case with general social welfare functions. Moreover,
the tax function itself is strictly concave with income and average tax rates are generally
single-peaked. We also show in particular that when quasilinear utility functions apply
in either consumption or leisure, so that income eﬀects are suppressed, the optimal tax
analysis and the results obtained from it turn out to be quite simple. In these cases, the
distribution of skills is a key determinant of the tax schedule, and has the same qualitative
inﬂuence for either case of quasilinearity. The shape of the tax structure can depend upon
whether the skill distribution is bounded at the top.
1Following Okun’s (1975) interpretation of Rawls, when all the weight is placed on the most needy,
the optimal tax literature uses the term ‘Rawlsian objective’. Obviously, this interpretation does not
adequately reﬂect the richness of the Theory of Justice of Rawls (1971), but it is the common practice in
economics.
2In the following section, we outline the basic features of the model. Section 3 considers
the properties of the optimal tax function with general additive preferences. We present
the optimal tax formula in terms of the elasticity of labor supply, the pattern of marginal
utilities of consumption, and the shape of the skill distribution. We derive suﬃcient
conditions for decreasing marginal tax rates in skill and a single-peaked average tax proﬁle
in income. We pay particular attention to the validity of the so-called ﬁrst-order approach
and derive suﬃcient conditions for this to be valid with general additive preferences.
In Section 4, we then turn to quasilinear-in-leisure preferences, which have an obvious
pedagogical value since these preferences ease the solutionconsiderably. Qualitative results
for some speciﬁc skill distributions are derived. Section 5 studies the tax structure with
quasilinear-in-consumption preferences. When the elasticity of labor supply is constant,
the optimal tax patterns are similar for both types of quasilinear preferences. We also
allow for a variable elasticity of labor supply using a logarithmic utility of leisure, as in
Diamond (1998). In our analysis, bunching can only occur at the bottom when the non-
negativity constraint that must be imposed on the household income is binding. Section 6
then analyzes the consequences for the tax structure of this binding constraint. The ﬁnal
section summarizes.
2 The model
Assume that all households have the same additively separable utility function:
u(x,ℓ) = v(x) −h(ℓ) (1)
where x is consumption and ℓ is labor (so 1 − ℓ is leisure), with v′ > 0 ≥ v′′, h′ > 0
and h′′ ≥ 0, with either v′′ < 0 or h′′ > 0. Such preferences satisfy the single-crossing or
monotonicity property that is important for optimal income tax analysis. Households diﬀer
only in skills, which correspond with their wage rates given that aggregate production is
linear in labor. These wage rates w are distributed according to the distribution function
F(w) for w ∈ W = [w,w], where 0 < w < w ≤ ∞. The corresponding density function,
f(w) = F′(w), is assumed to be diﬀerentiable and strictly positive for all w ∈ W. It is
assumed that the distribution is single-peaked, with a mode at wm.
Households obtain all their income from wages, and before-tax income is denoted by
y ≡ wℓ. Let x(w), ℓ(w) and y(w) be consumption, labor supply andincome for a household
with skill w. The government can observe incomes but not wage rates or amounts of labor
3supplied, so it bases its tax scheme on total income. Then, the budget constraint for this
household is:
x(w) = y(w) −T(y(w)) (2)
where T (y(w)) symbolizes the income tax imposed on type-w households. The household
maximizes (1) subject to (2), yielding the ﬁrst-order condition:
h′(ℓ(w))
wv′(x(w))
= 1 − T′(y(w)) (3)
If we use the deﬁnition of income to rewrite the utility function as v(x) − h(y/w), the
left-hand side can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income y
and consumption x. This is chosen to equal one minus the marginal income tax rate.




























where wn ≡ w(1 − T′(y(w))) is the after-tax wage rate.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the objective function of the government is
maxi-min, so the government is only concerned about the welfare of the least well-oﬀ
households. Given the information assumptions we are making, the worst-oﬀ will be
those at the bottom of the skill distribution whose wage is w. The determination of the
optimal income tax structure can be formulated as a mechanism design problem. The
government chooses the tax schedule T (y(w)) or, equivalently, the consumption-income
bundle intended for each household {(x(w),y(w),w ∈ W}, to maximize the welfare of the
least well-oﬀ households, subject to three sorts of constraints.
The ﬁrst is the government budget constraint, which takes the form:
￿ w
w
[y(w)− x(w)]f(w)dw ≥ R (6)
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement. This constraint must be binding at the
optimum since u is increasing in x.
The second is the set of incentive-compatibility constraints. These require that a
















∀w,w′ ∈ W (7)
4Ensuring these self-selection constraints is equivalent to reformulating (7) as a minimiza-
tion problem as follows. Deﬁne the value function of utility for a type-w household by:






















Therefore, combining the last two expressions for w and w′:










This implies that w′ minimizes u(w′)−v(x(w))+h(y(w)/w′) at w = w′. Evaluating the








This is the set of ﬁrst-order incentive-compatibility (FOIC) conditions. The ﬁrst-order
approach uses only these FOIC conditions. Since these are only necessary conditions,
their solution may not indicate a minimum. It may be necessary to adopt a second-order
approach and include the second-order conditions in the government’s problem.
The second-order conditions for the incentive compatibility (SOIC) constraint to be
satisﬁed is found using the second derivative of u(w′) − u(x(w),y(w)/w′) with respect to




w3 ≥ 0 ∀w (10)
These are the SOIC conditions, and can be rewritten as follows. Diﬀerentiate the FOIC



































y(w) ≥ 0 or
.
x(w) ≥ 0 are equivalent ways to write the SOIC conditions. Note
that if the SOIC constraints are slack (
.
y(w) > 0), the ﬁrst-order approach is appropriate.




y(w) = 0, so there is bunching of households of
diﬀerent skills.
The third constraint (highlighted in Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marchand, 2000) requires that
labor supply and therefore before-tax income be non-negative (y(w) ≥ 0,w ∈ W).2 For
now, we neglect the non-negativity constraint on income and assume it to be satisﬁed. We
investigate the consequences of this constraint being binding in Section 6.
The solution to the government’s maxi-min problem will give the highest level of u(w)
that can be achieved given R and the incentive constraints, where u(w) = v(x(w)) −
h(ℓ(w)). Let the solution to this problem be denoted u. This solution can also be obtained
from an equivalent revenue-maximizing problem which can be formulated as follows. Take
u as given and consider tax proﬁles that will generate this level of utility for the worst-oﬀ
households, given the incentive conditions. It is apparent that u can be supported by a
large number of tax proﬁles such that tax revenues are no greater than R, that is,
￿ w
w
[y(w)− x(w)]f(w)dw ≤ R
As long as the incentive constraints are satisﬁed for all w, we know from the above problem
that generating the utility level u requires that the tax revenue generated cannot exceed
R, so the above inequality must be satisﬁed. In fact, if we maximize the amount of tax
revenue that will yield utility u for the worst-oﬀ households, that level of revenue will be
precisely R. Therefore, maximizing tax revenue subject to u(w) ￿ u and the incentive
conditions is an equivalent problem to the one of maximizing u(w) subject to tax revenues
being at least equal to R and the incentive conditions. The purpose of drawing attention
to these two equivalent approaches to solving the maxi-min optimal income tax problem
is to relate our approach to the revenue-maximizing approach used by other authors (e.g.,
d’Autume, 2001; Piketty, 1997).
3 The general additive case
We proceed by ﬁrst studying the optimal income tax problem for the case where house-
hold utilities take the general additive form. Unambiguous qualitative results in this
2A maximum labor supply constraint could also be required, although we ignore this requirement in
this paper. By the same token, we should impose the requirement that consumption be non-negative
(x(w) ≥ 0). However, given our maxi-min objective and the fact that x(w) is increasing in w, this
constraint will not be binding in our analysis.
6case are somewhat limited, though the sources of inﬂuences at work can be identiﬁed.
In the next section, we turn to two quasilinear forms of (1) that have been prominent
in the literature–quasilinear-in-leisure and quasilinear-in-consumption–where somewhat
sharper results are obtained.
For expositional purposes, we follow the ﬁrst-order approach and ignore the SOIC
conditions. Later we can verify whether the latter are satisﬁed for the maxi-min case.
In the government’s maxi-min problem, to deal with the fact that the objective function
is simply u(w), we transform the objective function to make it amenable to the control
theory approach. Let I (w) be an indicator function such that I (w) = 1 if w = w, and
I (w) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, from (1), we have that u(w) = v(x(w)) − h(ℓ(w)),
which implies that u(w), x(w), and ℓ(w) are not independent. We can therefore treat
x(w) as a function of the other two and write it as x(w) = X (u(w),ℓ(w)), where X(.)













This allows us to suppress x(w) from the government problem.
The government solves for the feasible tax structure that maximizes the utility of the













The equivalent problem consists in maximizing tax revenue subject to a boundary condi-










For both problems, Appendix 1 describes the variational techniques used and derives the
necessary conditions for a maximum.
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the optimum nonlinear marginal tax in each
















dt ∀w ∈ W (13)
7Note that this formula for optimal marginal tax rates does not depend on either u or R
explicitly, although of course the levels of tax liabilities do. Formula (13) allows us to
obtain some simple properties with a maxi-min criterion and additive preferences.
First, the marginal tax rate at the top is zero (T′ (y(w)) = 0) with a bounded skill
distribution.3 The zero marginal tax rate at the top is a standard result with a bounded
skill distribution (see Sadka, 1976; Seade, 1977): raising the marginal tax rate at the top
above zero is suboptimal because it would distort the labor supply decision of the highest
earner but would raise no revenue. With an unbounded distribution, this intuition may
not apply since in this case, there is always a household with a higher wage level than the
one at which we calculate the optimal marginal tax rate. Even so, the asymptotic tax rate
tends to zero if [1 + ℓh′′(ℓ)/h′(ℓ)] and the hazard rate (1 −F(w))/f(w) are constant.4
Second, at the bottom of the skill distribution where w = w, the optimal marginal tax
rate is strictly positive.5 This maxi-min result is in sharp contrast with the standard result
of zero marginal tax rate at the bottom when using as an objective a social welfare function
with non-negative aversion to inequality and assuming no bunching at the bottom (Seade,
1977; Myles, 1995). To understand this contrasting result, recall the equity-eﬃciency
tradeoﬀ from which the optimal tax schedule results. A rise in T′(.) at any skill level ￿ w
distorts the labor supply of those with skill ￿ w, implying an eﬃciency loss. However, an
increase of T′(y(￿ w)) increases the tax receipts from those with w > ￿ w, implying more
redistribution towards those with skills w ≤ ￿ w. As long as the former contribute less to
the welfare criterion than the latter, such transfers are positively valued hence, an equity


















































At the top, we have [1−F(w)]/[wf(w)] = 0 (which is obvious if f(w)  = 0 and remains valid if f(w) = 0, as
can be shown using l’Hôpital’s rule). Therefore, since [1+ ℓh
′′(ℓ)/h
′(ℓ)] is always positive, the asymptotic
marginal tax rate is zero with bounded skill distributions.
4To see this, let us denote H the constant hazard rate (1 − F(w))/f(w). Therefore limw→∞
1−F (w)
wf(w) =







/[1 − F(w)], T
′ tends to zero when [1 + ℓh
′′(ℓ)/h
′(ℓ)] and the hazard rate
are constant.
5There will still be a positive tax rate at the bottom if there is bunching, either due to an interval
of low-skilled persons who are not working (Seade, 1977) or due to the violation of SOIC constraints
(Guesnerie and Laﬀont, 1984 and Ebert, 1992).
8gain appears. Suppose ￿ w = w. With a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, the
equity eﬀect vanishes since there is an inﬁnitesimally small number of persons at w (and
no one below).6 However, with a maxi-min criterion, everyone in the objective function is
at w = w, so the equity eﬀect is positive. Therefore, T′(y(w)) > 0 at the optimum.7
Finally, the right-hand side is always nonnegative, so T′(y(w)) ≥ 0. To characterize
the pattern of marginal tax rates for skills in the interior, it is useful to understand the
intuition behind the multiplicative components of (13).
The ﬁrst component, [1 + ℓh′′(ℓ)/h′(ℓ)], is a measure of the elasticity of labor supply
and as such reﬂects an eﬃciency eﬀect. Using (4) and (5), this factor is equivalent to
[1 + eu(wn)]/ec(wn). A priori, it is not clear how this term varies with skills. Following
Diamond (1998), we shall often assume that this term is constant.
The second term, 1/[wf(w)], can be called the density eﬀect. It indicates that the
optimal marginal tax rate is lower the higher are aggregate skills wf(w) at skill level w.
The loss of revenue from increasing the marginal tax rate is higher, the higher is wf(w).
With single-peaked skill distributions, this term always decreases below the mode of the
distribution. Above the mode, it will either increase or decrease depending on how rapidly
f (w) falls with w.
The ﬁnal term in (13), v′(x(w))
￿ w
w f(t)/v′ (x(t))dt, is the product of the marginal
utility of consumption and the gain in tax revenue from decreasing the utility of everyone
above w by one unit. Let us call it the global revenue eﬀect. The intuition of this eﬀect
is as follows. Suppose we reduce the utility of everyone above w by a marginal unit (so
that the FOIC constraints are still satisﬁed in that range). The gain in increased revenue
is 1/v′(x(w)) per person, while there is no loss of social welfare since the utility of those
with w > w does not count with a maxi-min criterion. Thus, the integral represents the
net eﬀect of a marginal reduction in u above w, and depends on the number of people
above w. The entire term v′(x(w))
￿ w
w f(t)/v′ (x(t))dt is declining with w since we assume
that the v(x) function is concave and since the integral term decreases in w.
From the above, we can infer that when h(ℓ) takes the constant elasticity form so
the ﬁrst term in (13) is constant, the marginal tax rate always decreases in w below the
6If there is bunching at the bottom, there will be a mass of people there and the equity eﬀect will be
positive.




1−ν f(w)dw → min
w {u(w)}f(w)). Taking the limit of the solution to the standard
optimization problem as ν → ∞ results in T
′(y(w)) = 0 in the limit. Thus, the maxi-min solution is not
the same as the limit of the solution to the problem with a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.
9mode (
.
T′ < 0) with single-peaked skill distributions. After the mode of w, the shape of
the optimal tax proﬁle will depend on the relative inﬂuence of the density eﬀect, which
is ambiguous, and the global revenue eﬀect, which is decreasing. A suﬃcient, though not
necessary, condition for decreasing T′ over the entire skill distribution is that aggregate
skills wf(w) are non-decreasing beyond the mode.
So far, our analysis has been conducted as if the ﬁrst-order approach were valid. This
will be the case as long as (13) yields a solution for T′(y(w)) such that x(w) (or y(w)) is
everywhere increasing in w. To derive a suﬃcient condition for the optimal marginal tax







Given that v′ < 0, h′′ ≥ 0, the lefthand side of (14) will be decreasing if and only if
.
x(w) > 0 (and therefore,
.
y(w) > 0). Moreover, the righthand side will be decreasing in
w if and only if w(1 − T′(y(w)) is increasing in w. Therefore, the latter is a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the SOIC conditions to be satisﬁed (
.
x(w) > 0). Thus, a non-
increasing marginal tax rate (
.
T′(y(w)) ≤ 0) is suﬃcient for the SOIC conditions to be
satisﬁed. An implication of this is that since T′ decreases in w below the mode when
h(ℓ) is constant elasticity, the SOIC conditions will be satisﬁed there and there will be no
bunching at the bottom on that account.
So far, and as is typical in the literature, we have focused on how the marginal tax
rate changes with the wage rate w, and not with income y. Since the marginal tax rate is
always non-negative, T′(y(w)) ≥ 0, total tax liabilities rise with y. To determine how the






where T′′(y(w)) is the second derivative of the total tax function T(y) with respect to y.
As long as the SOIC condition
.
y(w) > 0 is satisﬁed for any w, T′′ (y(w)) takes the same
sign as dT′(y(w))/dw. Therefore, where T′ (y(w)) declines in w, the optimal tax function
T(y(w)) is increasing and strictly concave in y.
This last result has implications for the pattern of average tax rates, a dimension that
has drawn little attention. Assume that in the maxi-min optimum, the least well-oﬀ receive
a transfer, that is, T(y(w)) < 0. (This requires the government revenue requirement not
too large.) Therefore, the average tax rate T(y)/y will be single-peaked in income if T′(y)
is decreasing and T′(y) → 0. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where T(y) is strictly concave
10and T′(y) → 0. The average tax rate (that is, the slope of dashed lines from the origin)
ﬁrst increases up to income y2, and then decreases. A formal proof is given in Appendix
1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
To summarize this section:
Proposition 1: Assuming a maxi-min criterion and general additive preferences, the
optimal marginal tax proﬁle has the following characteristics:
(i) At the bottom of the skill distribution, the optimal marginal tax rate is strictly positive
(even without bunching).
(ii) The optimal marginal tax rate at the top is zero with a bounded distribution. With
unbounded distributions, when the hazard rate and the elasticity of labor are con-
stant, the marginal asymptotic tax rate equals zero.
(iii) If the elasticity of labor is constant, the optimal marginal tax rate is decreasing
below the modal skill with a single-peaked skill distribution.
(iv) If the elasticity of labor is constant, aggregate skills wf(w) non-decreasing with the
productivity level is a suﬃcient condition for a decreasing T′(.) over the entire skill
distribution.
(v) A non-increasing T′(.) is suﬃcient for satisfying the SOIC conditions. Below the
mode, the SOIC conditions are always satisﬁed with a constant elasticity of labor
supply.
(vi) T′(.) decreasing in skill is necessary and suﬃcient for T(y) to be increasing and
strictly concave in income. The average tax rate will then be single-peaked in income
if T(y) < 0 and T′(y) → 0.
Note for future reference that (13) can be written in a way that is directly analogous



















dt and C (w) =
1 −F (w)
wf (w)
This way of writing the factors will be useful in the next sections.
114 Quasilinear-in-leisure preferences
In this section, we assume that preferences are quasilinear in leisure, so h(ℓ) = ℓ and v(x)
is increasing and strictly concave. This setting is the same as Lollivier and Rochet (1983),
Weymark (1986a, 1986b, 1987), Ebert (1992) and Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marchand (2000).
Utility can then be written u(x,y/w) = v(x) − y/w. Such preferences are characterized
by the absence of income eﬀects in the choice of consumption. Furthermore, A(w) =
1 + ℓh′′ (ℓ)/h′ (ℓ) = 1 in this case, so another of the three inﬂuences on the optimal tax
structure is shut down. We begins by deriving general properties for the optimal tax
structure, and then consider the tax structure for speciﬁc skill distributions.
4.1 The optimal tax structure
The optimal tax structure can be obtained as a special case of the general additive one.











This can be simpliﬁed considerably as follows. As shown in Appendix 2, from the ﬁrst-





dt = w(1 −F(w)) (18)
Then substituting (18), the ﬁrst-order condition for the household (3) and h′(ℓ) = 1 into





Thus, the structure of optimal marginal tax rates depends only on the properties of the
distribution function for skills as in Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marchand (2000).8
Since, as we showed above, a non-increasing T′(y(w)) with w is a suﬃcient condition for
satisfying the SOIC conditions,
.
C(w) ≤ 0 implies that the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed.
Therefore, the properties of the skill distribution may be suﬃcient to determine if the
SOIC conditions are satisﬁed.
8Some intuition can be given for this optimal marginal tax formula, following Boone and Bovenberg
(2006). Rewrite (19) as follows: T′(y(w))wf(w) = 1 − F (w). The left-hand side is a measure of the
marginal distortion associated with an increment of labor supplied by a type-w household. Thus, it
measures the eﬃciency gain from a compensated increase in ℓ(w), where the compensation involves a unit
of lump-sum income. The right-hand side reﬂects the fact that if income is increased by one unit for this
person, it must be increased by a unit for all persons above w in the skill distribution in order for the
incentive constraint to continue to be satisﬁed. This has a cost of 1− F (w).
12Withquasilinear-in-leisure preferences, it is useful for pedagogical purposes to note that
the optimal tax schedule can be derived from a simple Lagrangian optimization problem.








wf(w) +F(w) − 1
(21)
where λ is the multiplier associated with the government budget constraint. The ﬁrst con-
dition indicates that the marginal cost of public funds depends only on the level of skill of
the lowest skilled person. Intuitively, with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences, an increment
in government revenue requirements involves all households supplying an additional unit
of labor, that is, dy(w)/dR = 1 ∀w ∈ W. This is shown in Appendix 2. The utility cost
to this person–who is the only one whose utility counts–from supplying an additional
unit of income is simply 1/w. The second condition, (21), yields the optimal tax rate,
(19), after substituting in the ﬁrst-order conditions for the household, (3).
4.2 Results for speciﬁc distribution functions
Most simulations use a log-normal distribution which matches roughly the single-moded
empirical income distribution (Aitchison and Brown, 1957) but has also an unrealistic
thin upper tail. It has been argued that the Pareto distribution ﬁts the empirical income
distribution at high income levels reasonably well (Feenberg and Poterba, 1993 and Saez,
20019). However, these simulations rely on the assumption that the skill distribution takes
the same shape as the income distribution which is a strong an assumption. Therefore,
we use skill distributions which encompass the traditionally used ones and the Weibull
distribution which is ﬂexible enough to match a wide variety of decreasing and single-
peaked skill distributions andwhich also allows for a thicker upper tail than the log-normal.
Furthermore, it seems realistic to assume these distributions have an upper bound. The
distributions we then consider include the Pareto, the Weibull and the log-normal, both
in their truncated and untruncated forms.
9In Saez (2001), the skill distribution used is calibrated such that given the chosen utility functions
and a ﬂat tax (reproducing approximately the real US tax schedule), the resulting distribution replicates
the empirical earnings distribution in the U.S. This empirical earnings distribution seems remarkably well
approximated at the upper end by a Pareto earnings distribution. (Pareto already noted this almost one
century ago.) As the tax proﬁle is roughly linear in the U.S., a Pareto distribution is then also a good
approximation for skills at the upper end.
13Since C (w) is always declining below the modal skill level wm, so are marginal tax
rates. We therefore focus especially on how the various distributions apply above wm.
For those distributions whose densities are decreasing everywhere (e.g. the Pareto), we
suppose the distribution applies above wm.
Pareto distribution
Some well-known results depend on the distribution being Pareto and untruncated (Dia-
mond, 1998 and Salanié, 2003) above the modal skill level. The density f (w) of an un-
truncated Pareto is proportional to 1/w1+a for a > 0. Therefore, from (19), C(w) = 1/a,10
so the marginal tax rate is constant (and strictly positive) where the Pareto distribution
applies. Thus, the optimal income tax over the entire skill distribution has a so-called
hockey-stick proﬁle in skills: it has a constant marginal tax rate beyond the mode (analo-
gous to a linear progressive tax) where the Pareto distribution applies, and a monotonically
declining marginal tax rate before that.11
Intuitively, this result is due to the wide tail of the Pareto distribution which gives an
incentive to have high marginal tax rates at high levels of productivity since these raise a
lot of additional revenue. The top rate depends negatively of the thinness of the top tail
distribution. (With Pareto distributions, the higher the Pareto parameter a, the thinner
is the tail of the distribution.)
Since T′(.) decreases below wm and T′(.) is constant where the Pareto distribution
applies, we infer from (15) that the tax function is concave in income. It is strictly
concave below the income corresponding to wm and linear above that. From Proposition
1(v) and T′(.) non-increasing, the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed. Therefore, there is no
bunching on this account.
Since the marginal tax rate as w → w is larger than zero, the suﬃcient conditions
of Proposition 1(vi) are not satisﬁed, so we cannot be sure that the average tax rate is
single-peaked: it may be increasing throughout. However, in the (unrealistic) case where
the whole distribution of skill is an untruncated Pareto, the tax proﬁle is linear over the
whole distribution of y. In Figure 1, if the tax function were increasing and linear in y,
it can easily be seen that the average tax rate is everywhere increasing if T(y) < 0 (cf.
10With quasilinear-in-leisure preferences, a ≥ 1 is assumed to ensure that marginal tax rates lie below 1
so there is no bunching at the top due to a violation of the SOIC conditions.
11These global results assume that the Pareto distribution applies for all skill levels beyond the mode.
It may be more realistic to suppose that it applies only begining at some skill level ￿ w beyond the mode,
as in Diamond (1998). It is possible that in the range between the mode and ￿ w the marginal tax rate not
be declining.
14Hindriks, Lehmann and Parmentier, 2006).
A truncated Pareto distribution (w < ∞) applying beyond the mode seems more












C(w) = −wa−1/wa < 0. The marginal tax rate therefore now (monotonically)
decreases with w both before and beyond the mode. In addition, T′(y(w)) is strictly
concave in w when a > 1 and strictly convex when a < 1. The SOIC conditions are
again always satisﬁed. Moreover, the marginal tax rate is zero at w = w < ∞, which
conﬁrms the standard result that the optimal marginal tax rate is zero at the top with a
bounded skill distribution. Therefore, since the tax function is strictly concave in income,
(15) implies that the optimal average tax rate has a single-peaked pattern if T(y) < 0
(Proposition 1(vi)).
Weibull and log-normal distributions









where β > 0 is the shape parameter and η > 0 the scale parameter.12With an untruncated
log-normal distribution, the density is
f(w) = e−(ln w− )2/(2σ2)/(σw
√
2π)
where   is the mean and σ2 the variance. With an untruncated Weibull distribution,
.
C(w) < 0, while with a log-normal distribution,
.










(lnw −  ) < 0.8σ (23)
12Varying the shape β of a Weibull density drastically modiﬁes the density proﬁle. For 0 < β < 1,
f(w) decreases and is convex as w increases. For β = 1, it becomes the exponential distribution, as a
special case. For β > 1, the density assumes wear-out type shapes and f(w) decreases after the mode. For
β = 2, it becomes the Rayleigh distribution as a special case. For β < 2.6, f(w) is positively skewed (has
a right tail). For 2.6 < β < 3.7, its coeﬃcient of skewness approaches zero (no tail), consequently, it may
approximate the normal density. And for β > 3.7, it is negatively skewed (left tail).















where erf(.) is the error function (encountered in integrating the normal distribution and deﬁned by,





dt) with derf(E(w))/dw > 0 and erf(.) ∈ [−1,1]. In this case, the suﬃcient condition
(23) for
.
C(w) < 0 is derived.
15Therefore, T′(y(w)) is necessarily decreasing over the entire Weibull and log-normal distri-
butions assuming (23) is satisﬁed. From Proposition 1(v), this also implies that the SOIC
conditions are always satisﬁed so there can be no bunching on that account. As well,
T′(y(w)) tends to zero as w increases, so the income tax function is strictly concave in
income. The suﬃcient conditions of Proposition 1 (vi) being satisﬁed, the optimal average
tax rate has a single-peaked pattern.
Suppose now that the Weibull and log-normal distributions are truncated at w < ∞.
We derive
.
C(w) < 0 with a truncated Weibull distribution (with a mode larger than
the scale parameter which is usually standardized to 1) and with a truncated log-normal
distribution if:14
e(lnw− )2/(2σ2)(g(w) −g(w))(lnw − ) < 0.8σ (24)
The marginal tax rate is then decreasing, and tends to zero at the top of the skill distrib-
ution. Therefore, the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed, the tax function is strictly concave in
income and the average tax rate single-peaked (if T(y) < 0).
We can summarize our results for quasilinear-in-leisure preferences and distinct skill dis-
tributions as follows.
Proposition 2: With a maxi-min criterion and quasilinear-in-leisure preferences:
(i) The tax pattern depends exclusively on the distribution of skills through C(w).
(ii) The optimal marginal tax proﬁle is decreasing in skill with truncated Pareto, with
untruncated and, if wm is larger than the scale density parameter, with truncated




























which is < 0 when w ≥ η. Therefore, a modal w larger than η is a suﬃcient condition for
.
C(w) < 0.







−(ln w− )2/(2σ2)/(1+ erf(g(w)))
where g(w) = erf
￿













In this case, we ﬁnd that
.
C(w) < 0 if and only if inequality (24) is satisﬁed.
16Weibull, and if conditions (23) and (24) apply, with untruncated and truncated
log-normal skill distributions.
(iii) The asymptotic tax rate is zero for all distributions considered except with an un-
truncated Pareto distribution where it is ﬁnite. With this distribution applying
beyond wm, the marginal tax proﬁle has a hockey-stick proﬁle in skill and income.
(iv) The tax proﬁle is increasing and strictly concave in income and the average tax rate
is single-peaked in income (if T(y) < 0) with all the above distributions except the
untruncated Pareto. When the whole skill distribution is untruncated Pareto, the
average tax rate is increasing.
5 Quasilinear-in-consumption preferences
In this section, we consider preferences that are quasilinear-in-consumption as in Diamond
(1998): v(x) = x and h′′(ℓ) > 0.15 Hence there are no income eﬀects on labor supply, and

















Since only a substitution eﬀect now prevails, the larger the labor supply elasticity, the
lower A(w), and the lower the optimal marginal tax rates.
Suppose further that the elasticity of labor supply e(w) is constant (e.g., h(ℓ) = ℓα),
so that A(w) = A. In this case, T′(y(w)) depends only on C(w), that is, on the prop-
erties of the distribution function F (w). With quasilinear-in-leisure preferences, we also
derived in (19) that T′(y(w)) depends only on C(w). The results of the previous section
then apply. All the properties we highlighted with distinct distribution functions for the
optimal tax proﬁle with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences are also valid with quasilinear-
in-consumption preferences and A(w) constant.
Our previous results with Pareto distributions may then be contrasted with Diamond
(1998) who uses a Pareto distribution and quasilinear-in-consumption preferences. He
15Actually, Diamond deﬁnes h(1 − ℓ) as the utility of leisure, with h′ (1 − ℓ) > 0 > h′′ (1 − ℓ). Therefore,
the expressions we derive are not exactly identical to his.









dt = 1 when v
′ = 1
17ﬁnds that with a standard social welfare function that is increasing and concave in all
its arguments and assuming an untruncated Pareto skill distribution beyond the mode,
the marginal tax rate is U-shaped. The use of a maxi-min objective eliminates the rising
part of his U-shaped marginal tax rate structure. As soon as the Pareto distribution is
truncated, the diﬀerence with Diamond’s result becomes even sharper. In this case, the
marginal tax rate decreases monotonically with w both before and after the mode.
With quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, it is straightforward to derive the opti-
mal tax schedule in a simple Lagrangian problem. Appendix 3 presents this derivation
and shows that the shadow price of public funds is simply unity with quasilinear-in-
consumption preferences. A unit increase of revenue requirements R will cause all house-
holds, including the least-skilled, to decrease their consumption by one unit. This has a
value of unity to the least well-oﬀ household.
5.1 An example with non-constant labor supply elasticity
When the elasticity of labor supply–and therefore A(w)–is not constant, the problem
becomes rather more complicated unless we assume special functional forms. A particu-
larly useful case is where the utility of leisure is logarithmic, a case considered by Diamond
(1998) and Dahan and Strawczynski (2000). The maxi-min criterion allows us to charac-
terize the entire optimal tax proﬁle for various skill distributions, rather than only beyond
the mode as in Diamond (1998) where a general social welfare function is used.
In this case, the disutility of labor becomes h(ℓ) = −ln(1−ℓ) and the utility function











In the absence of taxation, labor supply increases with productivity and approaches unity
as w approaches +∞. Hence the individual is induced to supply more labor up to a
maximum level, ℓ = 1 in our case. Then, from (26), the elasticity is decreasing in w and
tends to zero: limw→∞ e(wn) → 0. 17
17Empirically, Gruber and Saez (2002) estimates a labor supply elasticity higher at the top of the income
distribution. It is plausible that people at the top of the observed income distribution are also the most















where the middle term is the inverse of the hazard rate. Using this expression, we shall
investigate the pattern of marginal tax rates for a series of diﬀerent types of skill distrib-
utions as before.
Before turning to the characterization of optimal tax structures, recall that a suﬃcient
condition for satisfying the SOIC conditions is a non-increasing marginal tax rate. From
(28),
.
C(w) < 0 is no longer suﬃcient for T′(y(w)) to be decreasing in w. As long as ℓ(w)
increases with w, T′(y(w)) can increase with w. In this case, the SOIC conditions can
then be violated and our computations invalidated.
In what follows, we consider the pattern of optimal tax rates when the distribution
takes distinct shapes. Before wm, wC(w) = (1 − F (w))/f (w) will be decreasing as
before. Therefore, by (29), T′(y(w)) will be declining before wm for any single-peaked
distribution. The SOIC conditions are then satisﬁed below wm with this non-constant
labor supply elasticity so there will be no bunching at the bottom on that account. And
from Proposition 1(vi), the tax function is increasing and strictly concave in y below
the mode. Again, we suppose that those distributions with decreasing densities (i.e., the
Pareto and Weibull with β ≤ 1) apply beyond wm, while those with single-peaked densities
apply everywhere.
Pareto distribution
Suppose the skilldistributionis Pareto above wm. For anuntruncated Paretodistributions,




This implies that the marginal tax rate is monotonically increasing with w where the
Pareto distribution applies. Moreover, as w → ∞, we have from (29):
T′(y(w))
(1 −T′(y(w))2 → ∞
productive. This then questions the relevance of assuming a logarithmic utility of leisure. However, it
allows to contrast and extend analytical results of Diamond (1998) and Dahan and Strawczynski (2000)
in interesting directions.
19which means that T′(y(w)) goes to unity at the top. This result occurs because with an
untruncated Pareto distribution, C(w) is constant (1/a). From (28), the only factor that
varies along the entire skill range is A(w) ≡ 1/(1−ℓ(w)). Therefore, A(w) goes to inﬁnity
as the wage goes to inﬁnity, so the optimal asymptotic tax rate goes to unity.
From (15), as long as the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed, the tax function is then
increasing and strictly convex in y where the Pareto distribution applies. Therefore,
we cannot draw the same conclusions about average tax rates for a Pareto distribution
applying beyond the mode since the suﬃcient conditions of Proposition 1(vi) are not
satisﬁed.18









Therefore, again, for a bounded distribution, we have a zero marginal tax rate at the top.
Moreover,
.





. Hence, the optimal






. Overall, the marginal tax rate declines in skill until wm, and then takes
an inverted U-shape once the Pareto distribution sets in.19 Moreover, assuming that the
SOIC conditions are satisﬁed where T′(.) increases with w (which is not guaranteed), (15)
would imply that, beyond the mode, T′(y) ﬁrst increases with y and becomes decreasing
for higher y. This implies that the marginal tax rates cannot be U-shaped in income.
The optimal average tax rate is increasing at the bottom of the income distribution (if
T(y) < 0) and decreasing (at least) close to the top. (We cannot conclude about the
average tax proﬁle over the rest of the distribution.)
Weibull distribution
Suppose ﬁrst that the Weibull distribution is untruncated. For β ≤ 1, the density is




increases, is strictly convex and tends to ∞ when w → w = ∞. (Note
that wC(w) is unbounded at w.) Then, the marginal tax rate increases and is strictly
convex in w. Moreover, at w = ∞, from (29), T′(y(w)) goes to unity. From (15), the
increasing (in y) tax function is then strictly convex once the Weibull distribution sets in,
18In the speciﬁc case where the whole skill distribution is Pareto, the tax function is increasing and
strictly convex in y everywhere hence, as soon as we assume T(y) < 0, the average tax rate is increasing in
y. This last result can easily be veriﬁed through a similar graphical exercise to the one of Figure 1, here,
with a strictly convex tax function.
19As before, if there is a range between the mode and the skill level at which the Pareto distribution
applies, the marginal tax rate could be rising or falling there.
20as long as the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed. Therefore, we cannot conclude about average
tax rates for a Weibull distribution applying beyond the mode since suﬃcient conditions
of Proposition 1(vi) are not satisﬁed. However, in the speciﬁc case where the whole skill
distribution is Weibull with β < 1, the tax function is increasing and strictly convex in y
everywhere. If we assume T(y(w)) < 0, the average tax rate is increasing in y.
For β = 1, which is the special case of an exponential distribution, wC(w) = η.
Therefore, the marginal tax rate in the maxi-min case is constant (and strictly positive) in
the range where the exponential distribution applies. Thus, the optimal marginal income
tax has a hockey-stick proﬁle: the marginal tax rate is constant for w > wm where the
exponential distribution applies, and declines before that.
From (29), it is interesting to note that a (strictly positive) constant wC(w) (equiv-
alently, a constant hazard rate) implies that a 100 percent marginal tax rate at the top
is never optimal. The optimal tax function itself is increasing and concave in y. It is
increasing in y below y(wm) and constant above it. Therefore, our suﬃcient conditions of
Proposition 1(vi) are not satisﬁed and we can draw no conclusions on the average tax rate
except at the bottom where it is increasing in y (if T(y) < 0). However, if the exponential
distribution applies over the whole distribution, the optimal tax proﬁle is then linear in y
hence, the optimal average tax rate is increasing in y (if T(y) < 0).
For β > 1, wC(w) increases, is strictly concave and tends to ∞ at the top. Then,
T′(y(w)) is increasing in w and strictly concave above wm where this distribution applies.
The marginal tax rate tends to unity at the top. Therefore, when a Weibull with β > 1
applies and when the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed, the tax function is increasing and
strictly convex in y, with T′(y) → 1. Average tax rates are then increasing in y, if
T(y) < 0 when the Weibull with β > 1 applies.
Suppose now that the Weibull distribution is truncated. In this case, wC(w) is always
decreasing when, as previously, we assume that wm > η (usually standardized to 1).
Therefore, T′(y(w)) is necessarily decreasing over the entire Weibull distribution range,
and the SOIC conditions are satisﬁed. Again, the optimal asymptotic tax rate is equal to
zero. From Proposition 1(vi), the optimal tax function is then strictly concave and the
optimal average tax rate is single-peaked (if T(y) < 0).
Log-normal distribution
Again, we begin with the untruncated case. Recall that the right-hand-side of (29) is
the inverse of the hazard function. We know that the hazard function of the log-normal
21distribution ﬁrst increases from zero and then ultimately falls back to zero. Hence, the
marginal tax scheme is U-shaped. The hazard function of the log-normal distribution does
in fact have a single maximum at a value of x = (logw −  )/σ satisfying h(x) = σ +  
(Lancaster, 1990). At the median skill (w = e ), x = 0. The value of σ such that h(0) = σ
is 0.7978 (see Table 3.1., Lancaster, 1990). Therefore, if σ ≃ 0.8, the minimum marginal
tax rate is at the median. Moreover if σ is lower than 0.8, then the minimum point is to
the left of the median, and vice versa (Dahan and Strawczynski, 2004).
We can show that if σ ≃ 0.4, marginal tax rates decline until the mean (e +0.5σ2
with
σ ≃ 0.4) multiplied by e0.3, and then they rise, so the minimum marginal tax rate is at
the mean multiplied by e0.3. Moreover, if σ > 0.4, then the minimum point is at the right
of the mean multiplied by e0.3, and vice versa.20
Again, the SOIC conditions may be violated in the range of w where T′(.) increases.







(e.g. Lancaster, 1990; Dahan and Strawczynski, 2004), we obtain as with the untruncated
Pareto distribution:
T′(y(w))
(1 −T′(y(w))2 → ∞
which means that T′(y(w)) goes to unity at the top. Again this is because the elasticity of
labor supply goes to zero at the top when utility is linear in consumption. From (15), the
tax proﬁle is then increasing and concave in y below and beyond the mode up to a certain
y where it becomes convex. Therefore, the average tax rate is increasing at the bottom of
the income distribution and we cannot conclude for the rest of the distribution.
Finally, suppose that the log-normal distribution is truncated at w < ∞. In this case:
.
wC(w) < 0 as e(lnw−µ)2/(2σ2)(g(w) −g(w))(σ2 + lnw − ) < 0.8σ (30)
and again we have the standard result for a bounded distribution, T′(y(w)) = 0. T′(y(w))
is then decreasing in w and the SOIC conditions are then satisﬁed. The tax function is
strictly concave in y and the average tax rate is single-peaked in y (if T(y) < 0).
The results of this section are summarized as follows.
Proposition 3: Assuming a maxi-min criterion and quasilinear-in-consumption prefer-
ences, if the elasticity of labor is constant, Proposition 2 applies. If the utility of leisure
20Using Table 3.1. in Lancaster (1990), if σ ≃ 0.26, marginal tax rates decline until the mean multiplied
by e
0.23 and then they rise (i.e., the minimum marginal tax rate is at the mean multiplied by e
0.23). And
if σ > 0.26, then the minimum point is at the right of the mean multiplied by e
0.23, and vice versa. If σ
≃ 0.5, marginal tax rates decline until the mean multiplied by e
0.4 and then they rise, that is, the minimum
marginal tax rate is at the mean multiplied by e
0.4. If σ > 0.5, then the minimum point is at the right of
the mean multiplied by e
0.4, and vice versa.
22is logarithmic:
(i) T′(.) is decreasing for w < wm.
(ii) T′(.) is decreasing in w, T(y) is concave and the average tax rate is single-peaked in
y (if T(y) < 0) with a truncated Weibull (with wm > η) and a truncated log-normal
distribution (if condition (30) is met in the latter case).
(iii) For w > wm, T′(.) is constant with an untruncated Weibull distribution with
β = 1 (i.e., an exponential distribution), T′(.) is increasing with an untruncated
Pareto and an untruncated Weibull with β ￿= 1, and U-shaped with an untruncated
log-normal distribution. (The SOIC conditions may be violated and these last results
invalidated over any range of skills where T′(.) increases.)
(iv) The asymptotic tax rate converges to unity for untruncated Pareto, untruncated
Weibull when β ￿= 1 and untruncated log-normal skill distributions. The asymptotic
tax rate is positive but lower than unity with an untruncated exponential distribu-
tion.
(v) If T(y) < 0, the average tax rate is increasing in y with untruncated Pareto and
untruncated Weibull distributions, both applying over the entire skill distribution.
6 The non-negative income constraint
Throughout this paper, our analysis (especially in the case where utility is linear in leisure)
requires that labor supply and therefore before-tax income be non-negative. However, as
government revenue requirements R decrease, so too will gross labor income. Since the
SOIC conditions are not binding below the mode, y(w) will be increasing. Eventually a
point will be reached where incomes from the lowest-wage households fall to zero. As R is
reduced further, an increasing range of low-wage people ﬁnd their incomes reduced to zero.
Since they must all obtain the same consumption, we have a situation in which bunching
at the bottom occurs even though the SOIC conditions are not violated. This bunching
illustrates voluntarily unemployment where the low-skilled choose to work zero hours so
their gross incomes are zero over the bunching interval. From (9), this implies that utility
is also constant over the bunching interval. Moreover, the SOIC constraint
.
y(w) ≥ 0
implies that this type of bunching can occur only at the bottom of the skill distribution.
Thus, if R is low enough, at the optimum there is a range of skills w ≤ w ≤ wy, where
the non-negativity constraint on income is binding. Over this range, x(w) is constant at
x(wy) ≡ x0.
23Consider the case of quasilinear-in-leisure preferences. This is the case where non-
negative income constraint is most likely to be relevant, and is the most transparent case
to analyze. In the presence of this type of bunching, the ﬁrst-order conditions continue
to apply outside of the bunching interval. This implies that our qualitative results about
the optimal tax rates are maintained for all w ∈ [wy,w]. Associating λ and ζ(w) respec-
tively with the government’s budget constraint and the FOIC constraint, the Hamiltonian
becomes:










with ℓ(wy) ≥ 0 where wy is a new control variable and x0 = x(wy). Equation (19), which
gives the optimal tax schedule, is still valid for any w ≥ wy. In particular, individuals at
the top end of the bunching interval (type-wy households) have a positive marginal tax
rate. Therefore, if a solution to the optimization problem (11) implies y(wy) < 0, then the
solution to the optimization problem (31) is characterized by a non-empty range of skills
[w,wy] such that y(w) = 0 and x(w) = x0 for all w ∈ [w,wy], and the path of consumption
for households with skills above wy is characterized by (21).
Recall that if the non-negative income constraint is not binding, neither λ nor x(w) is
aﬀected by changes in R: y(w) increases uniformly with R. But, with the non-negative
income constraint binding, λ is aﬀected by changes in wy as shown by the following formula





It is evident that λ depends now on R, unlike the case when the non-negativity constraint
y(w) ≥ 0 is not binding at any skill level (see (20)). The diﬀerence between the two formula
is readily understood. Consider a unit increase in the required labor income of households
with skills w ≥ wy, this increase being triggered by a rise in R. This increase yields
1−F(wy) in tax revenue. The only loss in social welfare due to the increased in required
labor income comes from people with u(w) as utility level (hence, x0 as consumption).
To continue satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints of households with skill wy,
x0 needs to be adjusted by dx0 = −(1/v′(x0)wy)dy < 0. This causes a loss in the social
welfare u(w) equal to 1/wy. It also decreases public expenses by an amount given by the
ﬁrst term in the denominator in (32).
24Appendix 4 undertakes a comparative static exercise, similar to Boadway, Cuﬀ and
Marchand (2000) and Boone and Bovenberg (2006) but with a maxi-min criterion, to
determine the eﬀect of a change in R on wy and λ. We derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4: With a maxi-min criterion and bunching due to a binding non-negativity
income constraint, dλ/dR > 0, dwy/dR < 0, dx0/dR < 0 and dx(w)/dR = 0 for w > wy.
The results of Proposition 2 apply for w > wy.
Contrary to the case without bunching, a higher level of R raises the marginal cost of public
funds. The required additional resources come from additional work eﬀort of the employed
persons and new entrants into the labor market (as the bunching interval decreases), and
a lower consumption level of the unemployed.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to provide as full a characterization as possible of
the solution of the optimal income tax problem when preferences are additive and the
normative criterion is maxi-min. Focusing on the maxi-min objective is fruitful for a
number of reasons. First, it is straightforward to obtain a clear understanding of the
economic eﬀects underlying the optimal tax proﬁle since we are left with only two main
sources of inﬂuence on the optimal tax structure: the variability of labor and the shape
of the skill distribution. Second, one can derive analytical results on the shape of the tax
proﬁle in both skills and income without resort to numerical simulations. For example, we
can derive suﬃcient conditions for a decreasing marginal tax proﬁle over the entire range
of skills or incomes, in contrast to the U-shape proﬁle obtained when social welfare has any
non-negative degree of aversion to inequality (e.g. Diamond 1998, Saez 2001). Further,
we can derive suﬃcient conditions for a single-peaked average tax rate. Third, considering
the speciﬁc and often used quasilinear preferences, and assuming the elasticity of labor
supply constant when preferences are quasilinear-in-consumption, allows us to show how
the distribution of skills alone determines the optimal tax proﬁle, and generally results in
a decreasing marginal tax proﬁle in skills, a concave tax function in income and a single-
peaked average tax rate. With quasilinear-in-leisure preferences, as long as the minimum
income constraint is not binding, changes in government revenues induce equal per person
changes in income, with no change in consumption. This reﬂects the zero income elasticity
of labor supply and results in a very simple representation of the shadow price of public
funds. A consequence of this is that as government revenue is reduced, eventually some
25bunching will be induced at the bottom as the non-negativity income constraint becomes
binding. Once that happens, further reductions in the government public spending will
aﬀect both the size of the bunching interval and the structure of the marginal tax rates.
However, our previous general qualitative results continue to hold outside of the bunching
interval.
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28Appendix 1. General additive preferences
Derivation of optimal marginal tax formula (13)
The Hamiltonian function for the maxi-min problem (11) is:
Hu(w) = u(w)I (w)+ λ[wℓ(w)− X(u(w),ℓ(w))]f(w) +ζ(w)
ℓ(w)h′(ℓ(w))
w
where ℓ(w) is the control variable, u(w) the state variable (given by FOIC conditions (9)),
λ is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint (6) and ζ(w) is the multiplier of




































∀w > w (35)
ζ(w) = 0 (36)



















dt > 0 (37)
This equation is still true at w since there is no mass point at w. The shadow price ζ(w)
is the eﬀect of an increase of u(w) on the value of the objective function, u(w). Using (3),











∀w ∈ W (38)
Consider now the equivalent problem (12) where tax revenue is maximized. The cor-
29responding Hamiltonian is:
HR(w) = [wℓ(w)− X(u(w),ℓ(w))]f(w) +π(w)
ℓ(w)h′(ℓ(w))
w
where the control and state variables are the same as in the primal problem and the



























and u(w) = u. The transversality condition is:
π(w) = 0 (41)
The solution to this problem is equivalent to the solution to problem (11). By inte-







This is similar to (37) except that the left-hand side of the latter was the ratio of the
shadow price associated with the FOIC conditions to the marginal cost of public funds.
The shadow price π(w) measures the eﬀect of an increase of u(w) on the value of tax
revenue, and is essentially equivalent to the ratio of the shadow prices in the problem











∀w ∈ W (43)
This is exactly analogous to (38) for the problem (11), and conﬁrms that the solutions to
the two problems are the same.
Equivalently, (37) and (38) or (42) and (43) may be combined to yield (13).
Derivation of the optimal average tax proﬁle
From the binding budget constraint and the strict concavity of T(y), as soon as R is not










From T′(y) > 0, T′′(y) < 0 and T′(y) → 0, T(y) has an inﬂexion point at y = ￿ y < ∞. For
y ≥ (<)￿ y: T′(￿ y) ≥ (<)t(￿ y). From the two previous equations, we then have: t′(y) > 0 and
t′′(y) < 0 below ￿ y. Beyond ￿ y: t′(y) < 0 and note the ambiguous sign of t′′(y). Therefore,
t(y) is single-peaked when T(y) < 0 and T′(y) → 0.
Appendix 2. Quasilinear-in-leisure preferences
Derivation of (18)





+ λf(w)w ∀w > w (44)
This is a linear diﬀerential equation that can be solved using the method of the vary-
ing constant. Considering only the homogeneous part, we can write
·
ζ(w)/ζ(w) = dw/w.
Integrate both parts and deﬁne β(w) = ln(ζ(w))/ln(w) ⇔ ζ(w) = weβ(w). Then, diﬀeren-
tiating with respect to w, we get
·
ζ(w) = eβ(w) + weβ(w)
·







+λf(w)w ∀w > w
Substituting ζ(w) = weβ(w) obtained above into this last equation, we have: eβ(w)
·
β(w) =














With the transversality condition (36), evaluating ζ(w) at w = w implies that λ = −β0 >
0. Hence, the above equation for ζ(w) can be rewritten as
ζ(w) = −wλ(1 − F(w)) ∀w > w (45)
Substituting (45) into (37), we obtain (18).
31Derivation of (19) by the Lagrangian method
Transform the utility as in Lollivier and Rochet (1983), V (w) ≡ wu(x(w),y(w)/w) =
wv(x(w)) −y(w). The government’s problem is to maximize V(w) subject to
￿ w
w
[wv(x(w)) − V(w)− x(w)]f(w)dw ≥ R
and




where the ﬁrst constraint is the budget constraint (6) and the second constraint is the
integral of the FOIC conditions (7) using
.
V (w) = u(x(t)). Substituting V (w) from the
second constraint into the ﬁrst yields:
￿ w
w
[(wf(w) −1 + F(w))v(x(w)) − x(w)f(w)]dw −V (w) ≥ R
where we have made use of Fubini’s theorem to evaluate the double integral. The gov-
ernment problem is to choose V (w) and x(w) to maximize V(w) subject to this revenue
constraint. The ﬁrst-order conditions immediately yield (20) and (21). Substituting (21)
and h′(ℓ) = 1 into (3), we obtain (19).
Proof that dy(w)/dR = 1 with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences









This linear diﬀerential equation can be solved using the method of varying constant. From




















so, lnu(w) = −[ln(w) + γ(w)], where γ(w) is an arbitrary constant. Taking antilogs, we
arrive at:
u(w) = e− ln(w)e−γ(w) = (1/w)(1/eγ(w)) (47)































where we can redeﬁne I(w) as J(w)− R. From the deﬁnition of the utility, we have
y(w) = w(v(x(w)) − u(w)) = w(v(x(w)) −
￿ w
w
v(x(t))dt− J(w) +R (50)










where we have used Fubini’s theorem. Substitute this into (50) to obtain:
y(w) = K(w) +R
where (using Ebert’s (1992) notation)
K(w) = wv(x(w)) −
￿ w
w




Note that K(w) depends only on the distribution of skills and the functional form of u(x),
since v(w) depends only on these two elements. This implies that
dy(w)
dR
= 1 ∀w ∈ W (51)
33Appendix 3. Quasilinear-in-consumption preferences
Derivation of (25) by the Lagrangian method
Integrating the FOIC constraint (9) from w to w gives:



















w2 y(w)(1 −F(w))dw = R
where we have used Fubini’s theorem to evaluate the double integral. The government
problem is then to choose u(w) and y(w) to maximize u(w) subject to this revenue con-





wf(w) +(1 −F(w))(1 + e−1(w))
Then, substituting (3), where v′(x) = 1, into the latter yields (25).
Proof that dx(w)/dR = −1 with quasilinear-in-consumption preferences
From the utility function, we can write:
x(w) = u(w) +h(ℓ(w)) (53)
Substituting this into the binding government budget constraint (6), we obtain:
￿ w
w
[y(w) −u(w)− h(ℓ(w))]f(w)dw −R = 0
Using the FOIC condition (52) and Fubini’s Theorem, this can be written:









Substitute this into (53) using (52) for u(w) and obtain:










ℓ(w)(1 − F(w))dw + h(ℓ(w))
Since L(w) depends only on the distribution of skills and the functional form of h(ℓ(w))
(since ℓ(w) depends only on these two elements), this implies that
dx(w)
dR
= −1 ∀w ∈ W
Appendix 4. Derivation of Proposition 4
With bunching due to a binding non-negativity income constraint, we can derive two
equations in λ and wy. Integrating both sides of (35) from w to w with w = w + ε (with
ε approaching 0), we ﬁnd21
ζ(w) −ζ(w) = −wλ(1− F(w))
Since the necessary conditions for the Hamiltonian optimization problem associated with
(11) and the Lagrangian optimization problem in Appendix 2 are equivalent, λ will be as
well. Therefore, we can substitute (20) into (45) and obtain
lim
w→wζ(w) = −1
Substituting this into the previous equation, we obtain ζ(w) = −wλ(1−F(w)). From this
and (45), setting w = wy, we may rewrite
1 − λwy(1 −F(wy)) = λ
F(wy)
v′(x0)
which gives (32). Substituting (21) for w = wy into (32) for u′(x0) yields the following
expression for λ in terms of wy:
λ =
f(wy)
f(wy)wy − F(wy)(1− F(wy))
(54)
21Although (34) (slightly modiﬁed such that it is satisﬁed ∀ w ∈ [w,wy]) should hold (as all people in the
range [w,wy] should get the same outcome), integrating it would move us away from maxi-min. It would
imply that we weigh the utility of type w by the number of people receiving this utility. For maxi-min,
this is irrelevant.





Similarly for wy = w, we can write:
λ = 1 −
w − 1
w
Since 1/w > (w −w+1)/w, this curve must be downward sloping over parts of the range
[w,w] in (wy,λ) space.





[y(w) −x(w)]f(w)dw = R
Following the same procedure as in Appendix 2, the expression for y(w) when the non-
negative income constraint is binding is









{v(x(w))[wf(w)+ F(w) −1]− x(w)f(w)}dw
￿
Evaluating this at w = wy where y(wy) = 0 yields an equation determining wy:
(1 − F(wy))wyv(x(wy))+ R +F(wy)x0
=
￿ w
wy {[f(w)w −(1 −F(w))]v(x(w)) − f(w)x(w)}dw
(56)
which is upward sloping in (wy,λ) space if
.
x(w) ≥ 0 as shown in Boone and Bovenberg
(2006). Following them, when x′(wy) > 0, (wy,λ) are determined by the intersection of
the downward sloping curve (54) and the upward sloping curve (56). Clearly, (54) is not
aﬀected by a change in R. It can be shown (see Boone and Bovenberg 2006) that (56)
shifts upwards (and to the left) as R increases. Hence, wy falls and λ rises with R. By
(32), x0 varies inversely with changes in λ. However, by (21) we see that with a maxi-
min criterion, the rise in λ does not imply a reduction of consumption and a rise in the
marginal tax rate for all types w > wy as it would be the case with a utilitarian criterion.
36y
T(y)
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Figure 1 Single-peaked average tax rate
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